## Phillips 66 (PSX)

## Updated February 12 ${ }^{\text {th }}, 2019$ by Aristofanis Papadatos

Key Metrics

| Current Price: | $\$ 94$ | 5 Year CAGR Estimate: | 10.2\% | Volatility Percentile: | $52.5 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Fair Value Price: | $\$ 106$ | 5 Year Growth Estimate: | $4.0 \%$ | Momentum Percentile: | $50.3 \%$ |
| \% Fair Value: | $88 \%$ | 5 Year Valuation Multiple Estimate: | $2.5 \%$ | Growth Percentile: | $22.3 \%$ |
| Dividend Yield: | $3.7 \%$ | 5 Year Price Target | Retirement Suitability Score: | B | Total Return Percentile: $54.0 \%$ |
| Dividend Risk Score: | B | Realuation Percentile: | $71.4 \%$ |  |  |

## Overview \& Current Events

Phillips 66 was spun off from ConocoPhillips in 2012. Phillips 66 operates in four segments: refining, midstream, chemicals, and marketing. It is a diversified company with each of its segments behaving differently under various oil prices. When the price of oil began to collapse in 2014, the refining segment became by far the most profitable segment, as low oil prices improved the demand for oil products and boosted refining margins.
In early February, Phillips 66 reported $(2 / 8 / 19)$ financial results for the fourth quarter of fiscal 2018. Although benchmark U.S. refining margins plunged almost $50 \%$ in the quarter from $\$ 13$ to $\$ 7$ per barrel, Phillips 66 smashed analysts' earnings-per-share estimates ( $\$ 4.87$ vs. $\$ 2.86$ ). The impressive performance resulted from purchases of crude oil grades, such as Bakken and Canadian, at a deep discount to WTI. The refining segment generated 64\% of total earnings even though the company posted record earnings in its midstream and marketing segments. The midstream segment benefited from high-return capital projects completed in the last two years. Remarkably, Phillips 66 has exceeded the analysts' earnings-per-share estimates for 6 consecutive quarters. In fiscal 2018, Phillips 66 achieved record earnings ( $\$ 5.6$ billion), raised its quarterly dividend by $14 \%$, and repurchased $10 \%$ of its outstanding shares.

## Growth on a Per-Share Basis

| Year | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2024 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EPS | N/A | N/A | N/A | \$6.48 | \$5.92 | \$7.10 | \$7.73 | \$2.92 | \$4.58 | \$11.85 | \$8.90 | \$10.83 |
| DPS | N/A | N/A | N/A | \$0.45 | \$1.33 | \$1.89 | \$2.18 | \$2.45 | \$2.73 | \$3.10 | \$3.50 | \$4.50 |
| Shares | N/A | N/A | N/A | 636.76 | 618.99 | 571.50 | 546.98 | 530.07 | 518.51 | 464.4 | 430.0 | 350.0 |

Growth projects in the oil industry take many years to start bearing fruit and hence there is a great lag between capital expenses and their resultant cash flows. Fortunately for the shareholders of Phillips 66, the company is currently in the positive phase of its cycle. While it has greatly reduced its capital expenses in recent years, it has begun to reap the benefits from its huge investments in 2014 and 2015, when it invested a total of $\$ 9.5$ billion. In addition, management is well known for its discipline to invest only in high-return projects. This is the primary reason behind the past investment of Berkshire Hathaway in Phillips 66.
Phillips 66 will benefit from the new international marine rules, which will force vessels sailing in international waters to burn low-sulfur diesel instead of heavy fuel oil starting January, 2020. Diesel is much more expensive than fuel oil and hence refiners will enjoy a boost in their earnings. In October, the U.S. government was rumored to be attempting a postponement the implementation of the new rules for the U.S. and thus caused a sell-off of all the domestic refiners. However, this is not likely to postpone the new rules for more than one or two years if at all.
The only point of concern is the $50 \%$ plunge of benchmark U.S. refining margins, from $\$ 13$ per barrel in early October to ~ $\$ 6.50$ per barrel now. While adverse seasonality is a factor, refining margins are still half of what they were last winter. However, Phillips 66 performed impressively in the fourth quarter thanks to the deep discount of Bakken and Canadian crude to WTI, which is used in the calculation of benchmark margins. Moreover, Phillips 66 has repurchased its shares at a $5 \%$ average annual rate in the last six years and has confirmed its intention to continue to repurchase its shares at a similar pace. It is thus reasonable to expect at least 4.0\% annual earnings-per-share growth over the next five years.

Disclosure: This analyst has no position in the security discussed in this research report, and no plans to initiate one in the next 72 hours.

## Phillips 66 (PSX)

Updated February 12 ${ }^{\text {th }}, 2019$ by Aristofanis Papadatos
Valuation Analysis

| Year | 2009 | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | Now |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Avg. P/E | --- | --- | --- | 6.4 | 10.5 | 11.1 | 10.3 | 27.7 | 18.5 | 8.9 | $\mathbf{1 0 . 6}$ |
| Avg. Yld. | ---- | --- | --- | $1.1 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ | $2.9 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 . 7 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 2 . 5}$ | 3.5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Warren Buffett, who is well-known for his value-oriented mindset, slashed his stake in Phillips 66 by 36\% in Q3, from $7.5 \%$ to $4.8 \%$. Berkshire Hathaway reduced its stake in the stock in each of the first three quarters last year.
Nevertheless, thanks to its $24 \%$ correction off its summer peak, Phillips 66 has become reasonably valued and is now trading at a P/E ratio of 10.6, which is lower than its 10-year average of 13.3 . In order to be somewhat conservative, we assume a fair P/E ratio of 12.0 for this stock. If the stock approaches our fair value estimate within the next five years, it will enjoy a $2.5 \%$ annualized gain thanks to $P / E$ expansion.

## Safety, Quality, Competitive Advantage, \& Recession Resiliency

| Year | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Payout | --- | --- | --- | $6.9 \%$ | $22.5 \%$ | $26.6 \%$ | $28.2 \%$ | $83.9 \%$ | $59.6 \%$ | $26.2 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 9 . 3} \%$ |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{4 1 . 6 \%}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Phillips 66 has a significant competitive advantage, namely the discipline of its management to invest only in high-return projects. On the other hand, despite its diversified business, the company is cyclical, just like most oil companies. In the recent downturn of the oil sector, between mid-2014 and 2017, low oil prices resulted in high refining margins thanks to healthy underlying economic growth. However, in the Great Recession, the price of oil products plunged along with the price of oil and resulted in low refining margins. Therefore, Phillips 66 will have significant downside risk in such an event.

## Final Thoughts \& Recommendation

Phillips 66 is a well-managed company, which is properly positioned for almost any scenario of oil prices. Thanks to its $24 \%$ correction off its summer peak, the stock can offer a $10.2 \%$ average annual return over the next five years, in the absence of a recession. It thus earns a buy rating, though investors may be better suited to wait for a lower entry point.

## Total Return Breakdown by Year



## Click here to rate and review this research report. Your feedback is important to us.

Disclosure: This analyst has no position in the security discussed in this research report, and no plans to initiate one in the next 72 hours.

## Phillips 66 (PSX)

Updated February 12 ${ }^{\text {th }}, 2019$ by Aristofanis Papadatos
Income Statement Metrics

| Year | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue (\$B) | N/A | 112.86 | 146.56 | 195.93 | 179.29 | 171.60 | 161.21 | 98.98 | 84.28 | 102.35 |
| Gross Profit | N/A | 15606 | 21469 | 23163 | 24877 | 23351 | 25464 | 25576 | 21811 | 22945 |
| Gross Margin | N/A | $13.8 \%$ | $14.6 \%$ | $11.8 \%$ | $13.9 \%$ | $13.6 \%$ | $15.8 \%$ | $25.8 \%$ | $25.9 \%$ | $22.4 \%$ |
| SG\&A Exp. | N/A | 1314 | 1384 | 1394 | 1703 | 1478 | 1663 | 1670 | 1638 | 1695 |
| D\&A Exp. | N/A | 879 | 880 | 902 | 906 | 947 | 995 | 1078 | 1168 | 1318 |
| Operating Profit | N/A | -231 | 1078 | 2521 | 4612 | 2666 | 3430 | 4548 | 1098 | 1838 |
| Operating Margin | N/A | $-0.2 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ | $4.6 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |
| Net Profit | N/A | 476 | 735 | 4775 | 4124 | 3726 | 4762 | 4227 | 1555 | 5106 |
| Net Margin | N/A | $0.4 \%$ | $0.5 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ | $4.3 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ | $5.0 \%$ |
| Free Cash Flow | N/A | -1515 | 942 | 3990 | 2595 | 4248 | -244 | -51 | 119 | 1816 |
| Income Tax | N/A | 368 | 579 | 1822 | 2473 | 1844 | 1654 | 1764 | 547 | -1693 |

Balance Sheet Metrics

| Year | 2008 | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total Assets | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 42880 | 44955 | 43211 | 48073 | 49798 | 48692 | 48580 | 51653 | 54371 |
| Cash \& Equivalents | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 3474 | 5400 | 5207 | 3074 | 2711 | 3119 |
| Accounts Receivable | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 6842 | 8364 | 8354 | 8593 | 7900 | 6306 | 4411 | 5485 | 6424 |
| Inventories | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 3842 | 4113 | 3466 | 3430 | 3354 | 3397 | 3477 | 3150 | 3395 |
| Goodwill \& Int. Ass. | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 4426 | 4410 | 4064 | 4068 | 3794 | 4174 | 4181 | 4158 | 4146 |
| Total Liabilities | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 15940 | 18929 | 19918 | 27267 | 27406 | 26655 | 24642 | 27928 | 26943 |
| Accounts Payable | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 7715 | 9814 | 10007 | 9731 | 9948 | 7488 | 5155 | 6395 | 7242 |
| Long-Term Debt | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 428 | 417 | 391 | 6974 | 6155 | 8635 | 8887 | 10138 | 10110 |
| Shareholder's Equity | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 26917 | 26001 | 23264 | 20775 | 21950 | 21590 | 23100 | 22390 | 25085 |
| D/E Ratio | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.34 | 0.28 | 0.40 | 0.38 | 0.45 | 0.40 |

## Profitability \& Per Share Metrics

| Year | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Return on Assets | N/A | N/A | $1.7 \%$ | $10.8 \%$ | $9.0 \%$ | $7.6 \%$ | $9.7 \%$ | $8.7 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ | $9.6 \%$ |
| Return on Equity | N/A | N/A | $2.8 \%$ | $19.4 \%$ | $18.7 \%$ | $17.4 \%$ | $21.9 \%$ | $18.9 \%$ | $6.8 \%$ | $21.5 \%$ |
| ROIC | N/A | N/A | $2.7 \%$ | $19.1 \%$ | $16.0 \%$ | $13.2 \%$ | $16.1 \%$ | $13.3 \%$ | $4.7 \%$ | $14.3 \%$ |
| Shares Out. | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 636.76 | 618.99 | 571.50 | 546.98 | 530.07 | 518.51 |
| Revenue/Share | N/A | 176.34 | 229.00 | 306.14 | 281.56 | 277.22 | 282.08 | 180.95 | 159.00 | 197.40 |
| FCF/Share | N/A | -2.37 | 1.47 | 6.23 | 4.08 | 6.86 | -0.43 | -0.09 | 0.22 | 3.50 |

Note: All figures in millions of U.S. Dollars unless per share or indicated otherwise.

## Disclaimer

[^0]
[^0]:    
    
    
     to the contrary should be made. There is a risk of loss from an investment in marketable securities. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance.

